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Throughout the history of psychopathology, several meanings have been assigned to the
term melancholia. The main ones were related to affective disorders (fear and sadness)
and abnormal beliefs. At the time of Hippocrates melancholia was regarded mainly in
its affective component. Since that time, and until the eighteenth century, authors and
opinions have been divided, with both aspects (affective disorders and abnormal beliefs),
being valued. Finally, in the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries, with Pinel at its peak,
melancholia becomes exclusively a synonym of abnormal beliefs. At the turn of the
nineteenth to the twentieth century, the affective component returns as the main aspect
characterizing melancholia.
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INTRODUCTION
Throughout the history of psychopathology, many terms have
been introduced. Some have disappeared, as “Phrenitis” and
“Carum,” while others have survived (Berrios, 1996a). Among the
surviving terms, some have kept their original meaning, while
others have seen their definition change. “Melancholia” is an
example of the latter: since its appearance its meaning has differed
widely from the current one.
Burton, who dedicated a book to the phenomenon in the
seventeenth century, The Anatomy of Melancholy, states that: “The
tower of Babel never yielded such confusion of tongues as the
chaos of melancholy doth variety of symptoms” (Burton, 1883,
p. 240).
Throughout history, the two most important meanings of
melancholia had to do with affective disorders (mainly depressive
mood), and abnormal beliefs. Since Hippocrates, the authors
dealing with the subject have alternated between one kind and the
other of the symptoms.
Existing work on the subject tends to prefer one side of the
two: either insisting that the affective side of melancholia has been
neglected before the twentieth century (Berrios, 1996a; Stanley,
1983), or else stating that this aspect has always been paramount
(Radden, 2000).
This article aims at reviewing the contributions by the different
authors to the construction of the current term melancholia,
throughout history, holding the view that both affective and
disorders and abnormal beliefs have been valued (and not one of
them exclusively).
FROM HIPPOCRATES TO THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
Hippocrates (460–379 BC) attributed the melancholic state
(as well as other disorders such as dysentery, skin rashes, etc.)
to the excess of black bile, one of the four basic humors described
by the author (blood, black bile, yellow bile, and phlegm)
(Hippocrates, 1923). According to the author, these states were
clinically characterized by several symptoms, above all fear and
sadness.
Galen (129–216 AD) followed Hippocrates in his theory of
temperaments, referring four types of temperament resulting
from humoral excesses: melancholic (black bile) (in this case,
melancholy was the greek name, atrabilia the latin name), opti-
mistic (blood), choleric (yellow bile), and phlegmatic (“phlegm”)
(Galen, 1952).
For Galen, along with depressive symptoms (“all patients
presented fear and despondency”), melancholic patients showed
bizarre and fixed ideas (probably alike to what we call today “delu-
sion”) and a behavior which was consistent with such ideation:
“There are patients who think to have become a sort of snail
so that they must escape everyone in order to avoid having
their shell crushed, while others fear that Atlas, who supports
the world, may grow weary and vanish, among other imaginary
ideas” (Galen, 1976). On the other hand, Galen states that these
ideas are restricted to a theme, the remaining life of the patient
being unaffected: “although he was able to discuss other issues
reasonably and recognise the people who were present, he kept
believing that some flutists were constantly playing next to his
house. . .” (Galen, 1833).
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 81 | 1
Telles-Correia and Gama Marques Melancholia before the twentieth century
Aretaeus of Cappadocia (First Century AD), regarding melan-
cholic patients, states that: “Many fear to be given poison to drink;
their senses redouble in penetration and acuteness rendering
them suspicious and able to an extreme of discerning hostility
everywhere” (Trélat, 1839, p. 73–82).
He characterized this illness through two fundamental dimen-
sions: (1) as an emotional phenomenon, consisting of a state
of anguish (animi angor); (2) as an intellectual phenomenon
consisting of a delusional conception that absorbs and fixes the
mind (“in una cogitatione defixus”) (Trélat, 1839).
The notion of a partial delusion was to become dominant in
the authors dealing with the subject after Aretaeus, and until the
end of the eighteenth century.
Andreas Laurentius (1560–1609) was the author of an impor-
tant revision of the meanings assigned to the concept of melan-
cholia from Galen to the sixteenth century. He defines melan-
cholia as the presence of “delirium with no fever, but with fear
and sadness” (Laurentius, 1599). He adds that “all melancholic
patients have a disturbed imagination,” and dedicated a great part
of his work specifying the type of delusions observed in these
patients (fear that Atlas would drop the world, the idea of having
been beheaded or swallowed by a serpent, etc.) (Laurentius,
1599). On the other hand, he stresses that “apart from these ideas
their imagination remains undisturbed and they are able to speak
marvellously of all other issues” (Laurentius, 1599). Laurentius
believed that this pathology was caused by an excess of black bile
(in the like of Hippocrates and Galen). “The coldness and dark-
ness of this humour affect the mind, especially the imagination”
(Laurentius, 1599).
Bright (1551–1615), in his Treatise of Melancholy, which is
said to have inspired Burton in his later work, states in regard
to melancholic patients that they “are for the most part sad and
fearful, and such as rise of them: as distrust, doubt, diffidence, or
despair” (Bright, 1586).
Burton (1577–1640) tries to gather in his work a summary of
all the meanings of melancholia upheld to that date, comparing
such a task to “capturing many-headed beast” (Burton, 1883, p.
51). Even so, Burton tries to consistently unify the description of
the various authors.
He states that patients suffering from melancholia present
multiple symptoms, which “may be infinite,” the most frequent
being fear and sorrow (“Fear and sorrow are the true charac-
ters and inseparable companions of most melancholy”) (Burton,
1883, p. 109). However, among the several symptoms described
are included ideas of persecution, poisoning and jealousy. He
refers that these patients can be “most violent in all their imagina-
tions, not affable in speech.” But he stresses that these ideas are not
generalized but contained within specific boundaries, as “they are
of profound judgement in some things, although in others, non
recte judicant inquieti” (Burton, 1883, p. 283).
William Cullen (1710–1790) uses the expression “partial
insanity” to define the monothematic delusion in melancholia,
contrasting with “universal insanity,” which he equates to mania.
Nonetheless, the author highlights the difficulty of drawing a line
between the two situations: “the boundaries between universal
and partial insanity cannot always be drawn with accuracy”
(Cullen, 1793, p. 76).
For this reason, Thomas Willis (1621–1675), prefers to divide
melancholia in two types: the universal type (in which the “delu-
sion” is extensive to almost anything) and the particular type (in
which the judgement of the individual is affected only in one or
two areas) (Willis, 1683).
Sennert (1572–1637) defined melancholia as: “a concentration
of the soul upon the same idea or a delusion acting on a false
thought which is almost exclusive,” “whose judgement is little
changed or only in what regards one object.” This author included
in melancholic cases states of sadness or joy, as “in melancholy the
delusion is sometimes joyful” (Trélat, 1839).
Sauvages (1706–1767) held a similar view, stating that “melan-
cholia is characterised by exclusive delusion,” while Lorry (1726–
1783), refers to melancholia as “a partial delusion inflated with
exciting passion” (De Matos, 2007, p. 25).
In the beginning of the nineteenth century, Benjamin Rush
(1746–1813) described two varieties of partial insanity: tristi-
mania and amenomenia. While the former replaced the term
“hypochondria” (when the delusional ideas refer to the patient,
their condition or matters and are painfully lived), the lat-
ter replaced the term “melancholia” (when the delusions refer
to objects outside the patient and are lived with pleasure—or
absence of pain). It should be stressed that at the time hypochon-
dria was often regarded as a slight form of melancholia and not as
it is seen today (Rush, 1827).
Pinel (1745–1826) abandons the humoral theory in favor of
a more rigorous descriptive psychopathology, narrowing down
mental disorders to four main groups: Melancholia, Mania,
Idiocy, and Dementia (Pinel, 1806). In melancholia, the patients
are “overwhelmed by an exclusive idea, endlessly recalled in their
words, which seems to absorb all their faculties.” It is distin-
guished from mania, “nervous excitation or extreme restlessness,
sometimes to the point of fury, and a variable level of general
delusion” (Pinel, 1806, p. 150).
For Pinel, melancholia takes on two opposite forms: (1) “a
heightening of pride and the chimeric idea of possessing infinite
richness and power without limits”; (2) “the most fearful despon-
dency, a profound dejection or even despair, therefore considering
two forms of melancholia: depressive and expansive” (Pinel, 1806,
p. 136).
Hence, until the eighteenth century, most authors privileged
abnormal beliefs to affective disorders in melancholia. Aretaeus’
“angor animi” had disappeared leaving only the concept of the
mind absorbed “in una cogitatione.”
AFTER THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
One of the most important steps for the change taking place
in the turn of the eighteenth to the nineteenth century was
the work of Esquirol (1772–1840), who labeled “monomania”
several situations of partial insanity, characterized by delusion
which was limited to one object or to a restricted number of
objects: “I propose the word monomania a term which express
the essential character of that form of insanity, in which the
delirium is partial, permanent, gay, or sad” (Esquirol, 1845,
p. 200). “Regarding affectivity, they take on two forms: depressive
(lypemania), and expansive (monomania itself)” (Esquirol, 1845,
p. 202).
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According to Esquirol himself, “lypemania” is very similar to
Rush’s “tristimania” and to Pinel’s “depressive melancholia”, while
“monomania” is similar to Rush’s “amenomania” and to Pinel’s
“expansive melancholia” (Esquirol, 1845).
Therefore, partial insanity is no longer comprehended in the
term “melancholia” and is given a new designation, that is,
“monomania.” Esquirol states that: “writers have confounded
monomania with melancholia because in both the delusion is
fixed and partial.” Within “monomania,” a specific type may be
distinguished due to its depressive affective content, “lypemania,”
which Esquirol uses as a synonym for “melancholia,” (“lypemania
or melancholia”) throughout his work. In this way, melancholia
regains its connotation of a depressive state. The further disap-
pearance of monomania causes the term “lypemania” to fall in
disuse, while “melancholia” remains in use.
Two of Esquirol’s disciples, Falret (1794–1870) and Baillarger
(1809–1890) coined the terms “circular insanity” (“folie circu-
laire”) and “dual form insanity” (“folie à double forme”), based
on the affective characteristics and motor activity in which manic
excitement alternates with mental depression. These would come
to inspire Kraepelin’s nosology (Radden, 2000).
Tuke (1827–1895), in his compendium “A dictionary of
psychological medicine, giving the definition, etymology and
synonyms of the terms used in medical psychology, with the
symptoms, treatment, and pathology of insanity,” edited in 1892,
points out affective symptoms as paramount in melancholia:
“A disorder characterized by a feeling of misery which is in
excess of what is justified by the circumstances in which the
individual is placed” (Tuke, 1892, p. 787). He also refers the
frequent presence of delusion: “as a rule, the disorder of feel-
ing is accompanied, with more or less evidence, by a disorder
of thought, and actual delusion accompanies the melancholia”
(Tuke, 1892, p. 789). This delusion could take on any type. In
Tuke’s dictionary are included other reviewed concepts, such as
“monomania” or “circular insanity,” faithful to the designations
of the original authors. Curiously, in Tuke’s dictionary, the term
“mental depression” is often quoted as an antonym of exalta-
tion and a synonym of simple melancholia, without delusion,
“characterised by the chief symptoms of simple melancholia;
the patients look sad without having melancholic delusions”
(Tuke, 1892, p.240). This term, with a physiological conno-
tation, will be diffused until the twentieth century (Berrios,
1996b).
At the end of the nineteenth century, kraepelinian nosology
separates affective disorders (Manic Depressive Illness, including
melancholia) from Dementia Praecox. Kraepelin overvalues affec-
tive symptoms in the former and thought and cognitive changes
in the latter. Therefore, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the
idea of melancholia as a disorder mostly affecting the abnormal
beliefs restricted to some objects is gradually abandoned in favor
of a disease mostly characterized by affective symptoms, namely
depressive ones.
In the beginning of the twentieth century the term melancholia
was gradually displaced by the term depression, which had a
physiologic connotation, showing up in the medical manuals as
“mental depression” (Berrios, 1996b).
Nowadays the term melancholia is reserved to certain cases of
severe depression, usually known as endogenous depression. This
kind of depression is characterized by the presence of profound
sadness, anhedonia, loss of emotional resonance, vegetative symp-
toms (insomnia, anorexia, circadian variability in mood), a sea-
sonal pattern, motor retardation and presence of delusions and/or
hallucinations. It is thought that the endogenous depression has
mainly an organic cause (with several neurobiological alterations,
including psychoimmunological), and a better response to med-
ication (and in severe cases electroconvulsive therapy) than the
reactive depression (also called neurotic or situational depression)
(Telles-Correia, 2012).
It is in this perspective that the term melancholia appears in the
DSM-IV and DSM-5, as “depression with melancholic features.”
In the ICD-10 the term melancholia is not present anymore.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Since its appearance, the term “melancholia” has suffered an
evolution in its meaning.
At the time of Hippocrates, “melancholia,” resulting from
an excess of black bile, was a state characterized by affective
dimensions: fear and sadness.
Galen upheld Hippocrates’ physiopathological theory of
melancholia. However, apart from the affective characteristics, he
FIGURE 1 | Evolution of the meaning of the term melancholia throughout history.
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also recognized fixed and bizarre ideas, restricted to a theme, with
the other mental functions being preserved.
Aretaeus of Cappadocia, his contemporary, also upheld the
idea that melancholia consisted of an emotional (animi angor)
and intellectual (in una cogitatione defixus) phenomenon.
The idea of a partial delusion gradually became dominant in
the characterization of melancholia in the authors who came after
Galen until the end of the eighteenth century. This conception
reaches its peak with Pinel, who distinguishes “mania” (accom-
panied by general delusion) from melancholia (accompanied by
exclusive delusion; Figure 1).
At the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth century, the affec-
tive component is recovered as the main change characterizing
melancholia. With Esquirol naming the cases of partial insan-
ity “monomania” (the term “melancholia” being abandoned for
this meaning), and later, the definition of the cases of manic
excitement and cyclic mental depression by Falret, Baillarger,
and Kraeplin, the affective component of melancholia would be
revalued (Figure 1).
We thus conclude that throughout its evolution, “melancho-
lia” has been associated to two fundamental meanings: affective
disorders and abnormal beliefs. Some have minimized the impor-
tance of the affective component before the twentieth century.
However, we agree with Radden, as from Hippocrates to the
present day, many authors valued affective symptoms such as
sadness, grief and fear in the definition of “melancholia” (Radden,
2000).
It is our opinion that studies reflecting on the evolution of
concepts in psychopathology are important. Studying the history
of psychopathology is a powerful way of calibration, by which
language in Psychiatry can be improved and prepared for more
rigorous quantification.
The epistemology of psychopathology “has to include a com-
bination of methods as history, philosophy and empirical inves-
tigation” (Berrios, 2011, p. 39). The history of psychiatry and
psychopathology brings to us some information about the social
processes where concepts have evolved, philosophy clarifies if the
language used is sufficiently powerful, and empirical investigation
tests the validity of the new concepts toward reality (Berrios,
2011).
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